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This paper seeks to give prominence to the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), one of the earliest 
transnational NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region, and illuminates state-NGO relations in the region in the 
early days. Founded in 1925, the IPR was a novel organization in its membership and its purpose. First, 
its membership ranged universally inside and outside the region, including Australia, Canada, China, 
Japan, Hawaii, New Zealand, the US, Korea, the Philippines, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the 
Soviet Union. It also included observers from the League of Nations and the International Labor Office. 
Secondly and more importantly, the IPR was launched with a radical purpose of building a ?Pacific 
Community,? a transnational civil society in today’s word, through frank and rational discussion among 
leading intellectuals from all over the region. Though the majority of IPR members were national elites 
who maintained close ties with the governments, they believed that they could keep enough autonomy 
from the governments and independently pursue an idealistic regional order. This paper highlights the 
changing relationships of the IPR with the governments. In the 1920s, with optimistic hope for a new 
regional order, the IPR members found their mission to stay out of politics so as to independently pursue 
its own transnational ideals. Facing the turbulent international crisis of the 1930s, however, many 
members found its early ?Pacific Community? ideal as outdated, and strengthened their tie with the 
governments, believing that they could make worthy contributions to their governments with their 
knowledge and expertise on the Asia-Pacific region. The history of the IPR reveals the enduring dilemma 
of the NGOs; stay out of politics in order to pursue higher ideals, or get into politics in order to realize 
even a part of their ideals in policy-making process.
Introduction
After the end of the long Cold War, the Asia-Pacific region has witnessed rapid increase in transna-
tional NGOs. However, the increasing NGO participation in regional politics does not necessarily 
mean that the Asia-Pacific countries are moving from a state-centric order towards a transnational or-
der. In order to assess the true significance of the rise of NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region, we should 
analyze what kind of relationships they have with the states.
NGOs are not always ?anti-? governmental organization, and can have various relationships with 
states. Young Dennis (2000) classifies state-NGO relationships into three categories, supplementary, 
complementary, or adversarial. According to Michael Barnett (2005), though the number of the NGOs 
has increased since the late 1980s, most of them have been increasingly seeking for cooperative rela-
tions with the states, rather than criticizing them. Especially, the NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region have 
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a tendency to place too much emphasis on the relationships with the states. Many scholars estimate 
that increasing number of NGOs in the region would not have fundamental impacts on the existed 
state-centric order in foreseeable future (Heyzer 1995, 10?11).
Nevertheless, it is too early to conclude that the NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region have never at-
tempted to overcome the existed state-centric order. This thesis seeks to give prominence to the Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations (IPR), one of the earliest transnational NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region, and 
illuminates state-NGO relations in the region in the early days. Founded in 1925, the IPR was a unique 
organization in its special focus on the Asia-Pacific region, which was relatively neglected by peace or-
ganizations at that time, and then developed into the largest multilateral forum in the region during 
the Interwar Period.
The IPR was also a novel organization in its membership and its purpose. First, its membership 
ranged universally inside and outside the region, including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Hawaii, 
New Zealand, the US, Korea, the Philippines, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the Soviet Union. It 
also included observers from the League of Nations and the International Labor Office. During its pre-
war halcyon days, the IPR was one of the largest transnational organizations, which was equal to the 
International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation (ICIC), as an advisory body for the League of 
Nations whose mission was to promote international cultural/intellectual exchange between scientists, 
researchers, teachers, artists and other intellectuals. Until it closed its doors in 1961, the IPR held an 
international conference every 2 or 3 years, total 13 conferences (Honolulu, 1925 1927; Kyoto, 1929; 
Shanghai, 1931; Banff, 1933; Yosemite, 1936; Virginia Beach, 1939; Mt. Tremblant, 1942; Hot Springs, 
1945; Stratford-on-Avon, 1948; Lucknow, 1950; Kyoto, 1954; Lahore, 1958) in order to discuss a wide 
range of regional issues which might be possible cause of conflicts, drawing together a total of 1500 
leading intellectuals from both the Asia-Pacific and Europe (Hooper 1994, 112?113).
Secondly, and more importantly, the IPR was launched with a radical purpose of building a ?Pacific 
Community,? a transnational civil society in today’s word, through frank and rational discussion 
among leading intellectuals from all over the region. Though the majority of IPR members were na-
tional elites who maintained close ties with the governments, they believed that they could keep 
enough autonomy from the governments and independently pursue an idealistic regional order. At the 
IPR international conferences, the participants were required not to be ?country representatives? 
whose mission was to fulfill national interests, but to be ?transnationalists? who were free from narrow 
nationalism, and were ready to have frank discussions relevant for regional peace.
With deteriorating international situations in the 1930s, however, the nascent cooperative atmo-
sphere faded out, IPR members gradually lost their autonomy from the governments, and became just 
another defenders of national interests. During WWII, many IPR members even willingly served the 
government to win the war, utilizing their knowledge and expertise on the Asia-Pacific region accu-
mulated thorough participating in the IPR periodical conferences and research activities.
As the Cold War was intensified, McCarthyism cast great suspicions of ?pro-Communist? organiza-
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tions, and the IPR became one of the principal targets. After the ?fall? of Nationalist China in 1949, the 
McCarthy movement investigated and blamed ?pro-communists? in the government, universities, and 
international organizations. In 1952, Senator Pat McCarran formed the investigation committee of IPR 
activities, and concluded that IPR was responsible for the ?fall? of mainland China to communists. 
These charges had no substantial grounds, yet caused a fetal damage to the activities of the American 
Council of the IPR, which had played central roles in the activities of the IPR. Though the IPR still 
continued to operate after WWII, and held total 4 conferences respectively in Stratford-on-Avon 
(1948), Lucknow (1950), Kyoto (1954), and Lahore (1958), they did not gather as much international 
attention as the prewar conferences, and funding sources and membership constantly declined. Finally 
in 1961 the IPR was forced into dissolution.
1.?Literature Review
How can we evaluate the 40 years history of the IPR, especially its changing relationships with the 
governments? It is only recently that the history of the IPR has gained scholars’ serious attention. Es-
pecially in the US academia, the IPR had long been regarded as a mere tool of US cultural imperialism 
under mask of transnationalism (Arnove 1982; Berman 1983; Fisher 1983). Certainly, despite its mul-
tilateral structure, the research activities of the IPR hugely depended on Rockefeller Foundation, one 
of the largest philanthropic organizations in US. It is estimated that the IPR received approximately 
$1.5 million to 18.8 million from Rockefeller sources for operating expenses and international research 
program during its lifetime (Woods 1999). Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean that all the activ-
ities of the IPR were under the control of the US. Among various private research organizations found-
ed after WWI for better understanding of international relations, the IPR was distinctively idealistic 
and transnational in its approaches to international relations, reflecting long tradition of international-
ism of its birthplace, Hawaii (Hooper 1980). Certainly after the headquarters were moved from Hawaii 
to New York in 1934, US influence on the IPR research activities was becoming strong, yet even after 
that, each national council maintained its own research programs.
The unprecedented rise of NGOs in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War finally 
made scholars aware of its important precedents?the IPR, and several important scholarly works were 
published (Woods 1993). Pioneers such as Hooper (1994, 1995), Yamaoka (1994, 1999), and Katagiri 
(1994, 1999, 2003, 2008), utilizing plenty of archival materials, challenged the biased views on the IPR, 
and emphasized its positive contributions to nurturing nascent regional cooperation. Though they ad-
mitted that the 1920s was the golden age for the IPR in the sense that it could be most faithful to its 
original transnational ideals, they also gave sympathetic views on the IPR in the 1930s, which gradual-
ly lost sight of its original transnational goals in the midst of rising international tensions. Defending a 
nationalist turn of the IPR in the 1930s, they stressed that in the world where nationalism became a 
dominant ideology, IPR members had no choice but to follow national policies.
In the 2000s, however, scholars began to analyze the history of the IPR from more critical perspec-
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tives. Akami (2002) analyzed not only the activities of the IPR but the dominant ideology permeated 
among the members, using plenty of archival materials in the US, Japan, Australia, and Britain, and 
concluded that the majority of the members had quite conservative ideas about race, gender, class, and 
nation state. Akami also challenged the previous works as to why the IPR participants ultimately dis-
carded their original transnational ideals, and chose to follow national policies after the 1930s. While 
the earlier works emphasized the predicaments of IPR members, who did not have almost any choice 
but to follow national policy in the mounting international crisis, Akami argued that IPR members, 
the majority of whom were national elites, did not have any serious doubt on serving country, or even 
regarded it as their mission. It was only natural that in the time of international crisis, they did not 
hesitate to follow national policies. Akami critically pointed out that the ?status [of the IPR] as 
?non-governmental,’ ?non-official,’ or ?private’ did not mean much unless one examines whom they 
were ultimately serving?The IPR’s agenda as a non-state agency did not mean setting challenging al-
ternative channel for state-to-state relationships,? stressing that IPR members voluntarily rather than 
reluctantly chose to promote what they regarded as the interests of their nation-state in international 
arena (Akami 2002, 13?14).
This paper basically shares Akami’s critical analysis that the IPR was certainly a non-government or-
ganization but not an anti-government organization. Nevertheless, instead of just negatively evaluating 
IPR members after the 1930s as defeated or self-deceived idealists, the paper tries to illuminate their 
dilemma over the state-NGOs relations, which can be summarized as the choice between staying out of 
the politics or get into the politics.
In the 1920s, when optimistic hope for a new regional order was widely shared among the members, 
IPR members found their mission to stay out of politics so as to independently pursue its own transna-
tional ideals. Facing the turbulent international crisis of the 1930s, however, many members found its 
?Pacific Community? ideal as outdated, and decided to venture into the politics. They strengthened 
their tie with the government in order to reflect their voice in policymaking process, believing that 
they could make invaluable contributions to their governments with their knowledge and expertise on 
the Asia-Pacific region. The history of the IPR clearly reveals the enduring dilemma of the NGOs; stay 
out of politics in order to pursue higher ideals, or get into politics in order to realize even a part of their 
ideals in policy-making process.
2.?The Birth of the IPR?A New Approach to International Politics
World War I had critical impacts not only on the previous international order but on people’s views 
on future international peace. After the war, people increasingly suspected the validity of old type se-
cret diplomacy, which eventually could not prevent the war, and sought for new methods of conduct-
ing international politics. One of the major attempts was the League of Nations, which was founded as 
a result of the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919.
As far as governmental organizations are concerned, the Asia-Pacific region remained uninstitution-
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alized even after the foundation of the League of Nations. Though the League of Nations was expected 
to be an universal organization, its core members were European countries, and thus its main focuses 
were laid on European issues. Certainly the Washington Naval Conference, which was held in 1921?22 
in order to discuss regional security in the Asia-Pacific, contributed to stabilizing the region, but it did 
not bring into being a permanent regional organization.
In the 1920s, however, there were significant developments of the NGOs in the region, and the IPR 
was the most important initiative among them. In 1924 the Young Men’s Christian Association 
(YMCA) of Hawaii, utilizing its regional networks, organized an international conference of private 
citizens from Australia, Canada, China, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the US with 
the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and friendship. The success of this gathering led to 
the establishment of the IPR as a permanent organization in 1925, which involved not only YMCA 
members but leaders from all over the region, regardless of race, religion or political status. The head-
quarters, the International Secretariat of the IPR, were located in Honolulu until they were moved to 
New York in the 1934.
Accordingly, national councils were founded in each participant country. The Japan Council was es-
tablished in 1925, and 55 members were named to it. Many of them were academics and businessmen, 
who had actively committed to promoting US?Japan friendly relationships. Among the members there 
were some prominent figures in each field, such as Eiichi Shibusawa, Junnosuke Inoue from business 
and financial sectors, Inazo Nitobe a prominent Japanese liberal intellectual, and his disciples from ac-
ademia (Katagiri 1994; Yamaoka 1994).
After becoming a permanent organization, its original Christian coloring soon faded out and the 
IPR developed into a secular organization designed to offer a multilateral forum to discuss practical is-
sues for regional peace. For the first international conference held in 1925, 109 national delegates from 
Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Hawaii, New Zealand, the US, and some colonized countries such as 
Korea and the Philippines, and 31 official observers gathered in Honolulu. After the first conference, 
the IPR expanded its membership to the nations outside the region, such as Britain, France, Holland, 
which had colonies in the region, and eventually Soviet Union. The second conference was held again 
in Honolulu in 1927, and 137 delegates and observers from the League of Nations and the Internation-
al Labor Office participated in it (Hooper 1994).
The novelty of the IPR can be understood only when we look at the historical contexts after WWI. 
Today, many people regard informal dialogues by non-governmental actors only as a supplement to 
governmental dialogues, if not irrelevant to international relations. We should not, however, mechani-
cally apply these contemporary understandings to the IPR. After WWI, people lost their faith in politi-
cians and diplomats, whose primal mission should be to fulfill national interests rather than creating a 
more peaceful world, and came to regard non-governmental actors as an ideal actor for transcending 
narrow nationalism and promoting peace (Iriye 1999, 2009). The formal announcement of the first 
IPR meeting summarized the novelty of the IPR as following;
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?a body of men and women deeply interested in the Pacific area, who meet and work, not as rep-
resentatives of their Governments, or of any other organizations, but as individuals in order to 
promote the well-being of the peoples concerned??its main efforts will be devoted to collecting 
and elucidating the facts of international significance, which, by their influence in guiding public 
opinion, may assist constructively the development of the countries concerned; to urging the im-
provement of legal and administrative procedure where present methods tend to hinder interna-
tional harmony and good feeling; and promoting international friendship by personal association 
and by the study of economic, educational, social, political, moral and religious conditions with a 
view to their improvement.1
The announcement even said that if financial resources would permit, scientific investigations 
which might be ?purely academic for the present, although ultimately of vital importance? should be 
undertaken. Following this principle, each national council undertook various research projects on 
possible causes of regional conflicts and summarized these results for each periodical conference, 
which greatly contributed to the formation of Asian-Pacific studies in the US (Hooper 1988; Thomas 
1974). IPR members firmly believed that discovering objective ?facts? on the region and having ratio-
nal discussion based on them would be the most reliable way to realize a stable peace in the region.
At the IPR international conferences, participants from different national councils presented re-
search papers and conducted round-table discussions on a variety of subjects related to the region. The 
principles of the round-table discussion were best summarized by H. Duncan Hall, a leader of the Aus-
tralian group as following;
The business of the Institute will be to submit the most complex international problems in the Pa-
cific area to a patient and impartial, scientific investigation. Its attitude is scientific rather than 
controversial. It is a permanent ?fact-finding? body?A body which adopts the method of scientif-
ic investigation and seeks to get down to fundamentals cannot hope for immediate and spectacu-
lar results, but its results are likely to be more-far-reaching in ultimate importance than those of 
any ephemeral international conference?2
As a ?fact-finding? body whose main function was diagnosis rather than prescription, the IPR was 
expected to refrain from proposing any resolutions or remedial courses of action which might have 
even appearance of supporting particular policies. These basic principles were confirmed repeatedly at 
the successive conferences. At the second conference in 1927, Sir Frederick Whyte from Britain em-
phasized;
We here are not concerned with the execution of policy nor are we responsible for the diplomatic 
action of our respective governments. We are therefore able to seek the truth in all things. It is the 
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proclaimed function of the Institute of Pacific Relations, (A) to search for the facts out of which all 
policy is born, and (B) when the facts are known to examine all national policies without preju-
dice in order to see whether they really correspond with the facts?3
According to the preliminary draft, which was circulated before the Fourth Biennial Conference 
(1931) with the purpose of clarifying the history, purposes, and the methods of the IPR, the IPR 
?merely provides a forum for frank discussion of controversial topics and steadily adheres to its policy 
of taking no corporate action of any kind beyond the concerted advancement in understanding of the 
problems.? It even said that the membership of the IPR was intentionally made up of diverse elements 
so that the approach to unanimity of opinion necessary for political action would be impossible to 
achieve. Not only the IPR as an organization but each IPR member was also expected to stay out of 
politics and be autonomous from government intervention. According to the draft, each national coun-
cil should refuse official backing or sanction, receive modest funds only from private subscriptions, 
and include only ?private individuals, privately financed? who had ?no connection with, or help from, 
any of the governments.?4
3.?IPR in the 1920s: Staying out of Politics to Pursue Higher Ideals
The First Conference in Honolulu was filled with optimistic hope for a more peaceful regional or-
der. Certainly, there were potential conflicts such as anti-Asian immigration laws in the US and Aus-
tralia, and the rise of anti-imperialism movements in China, but the region seemed overall stable. The 
Washington naval conference successfully limited the size of the navies of Britain, the US, and Japan, 
and eased the naval race in the region. The US and Japan, despite the immigration problem, nurtured 
strong economic ties. Backed by these cooperative international situations, many participants at the 
first Honolulu conference expressed their optimism for a newly emerging peaceful Asia-Pacific, con-
trasting with Europe, which, according to them, had been contaminated with ?old politics? and finally 
devastated themselves with the world war.
At the second conference in 1927, which was held again in Honolulu, one member from each coun-
try gave a statement on their visions for future Asia-Pacific. While their views were diverse reflecting 
each background, they shared basic visions for future Asia-Pacific. First, many participants believed 
that the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in near future. Masataro Sawayanagi, Presi-
dent of the Imperial Educational Association of Japan, declared that ?The Pacific Ocean is gradually 
becoming the center of the world, and Japan in firmly lodged in the thinking of internationally mind-
ed people as one of the important Pacific Powers. As such, Japan’s future is inseparably linked with the 
slowly unfolding destiny of the great Pacific area.?5 British delegate, Sir Frederick Whyte also stressed 
that ?it has become a commonplace in recent times to say that the future of peace and war lies in the 
Pacific.?6 Frederick W. Eggleston from Australia stressed that the Asia-Pacific should become a ?pacif-
ic? sea just its name suggested.
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It is frequently said that the Pacific is the area in which the next war will take place. In my opinion 
such a statement is as misleading as it is mischievous?The Pacific nations are widely separated by 
the ocean. They are not crowded together like European countries. Do not let us argue from Euro-
pean analogies or be dominated by a European psychology in these matters. The spaciousness of 
the Pacific is a factor of safety. If there is no bankruptcy of statesmanship, the Pacific should be 
made an arena pacific in fact as well as name.7
The excitement of the participants for the IPR as a new approach to international politics was best 
expressed by the following statement of Herbert Croly from US, a well-known editor of the New Re-
public.
(The IPR’s) function is really novel and more radical than these delegates seemed to realize. It is 
an experiment in the use of the understanding in elucidating and integrating political relation-
ships. If it carries on its work with any success, it may eventually exercise an important influence 
on the world affairs in the Pacific.
Croly even stated that the IPR was an embryo of a future ?Pacific Community? which would over-
come the limits of European-based League of Nations.8 Croly’s ?Pacific Community? ideal reflected 
his disappointment for postwar Europe. During WWI, Croly enthusiastically supported President 
Woodrow Wilson’s intervention in the war, hoping that his idea of ?New Diplomacy? would replace 
European non-democratic and aristocratic ?Old Diplomacy.? Croly’s hope was, however, betrayed by 
the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, which was apparently backed by victors’ intension to keep Germa-
ny as weak as possible. The League of Nations without the US was, according to him, nothing but a 
new version of Holy Alliance. Convinced of the failure of peacemaking in postwar Europe, Croly be-
gan to search for a new arena and a new way to implement US idea of ?New Diplomacy,? and eventu-
ally found the Asia-Pacific region and the IPR as such.
In the 1920s, even the Japan Council, which received one-quarter of its operating funds from the 
Foreign Ministry, and maintained strong ties with the government since then, shared transnational 
idealistic visions with the other participants. Yasaka Takaki, One of the prominent scholar on Ameri-
can history teaching at the Tokyo Imperial University, emphasized the significance of the IPR saying, 
?The IPR might become a product of the modern civilization called the Pacific age?Some people 
seem to regard the goals of the IPR as mere fantasy, yet from my experience at the first Honolulu con-
ference, I became confident that the purposes of the IPR is one of the greatest human enterprises, and 
it will make significant contributions to advancing human civilization at the most appropriate time.?9 
Even at the third conference held in Kyoto from October 28 to November 9, 1929, during which the 
stock market on Wall Street collapsed and the long depression followed, such optimistic views were 
basically unchanged. For example, Nitobe expressed his hope for the rise of the Asia-Pacific age, refer-
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ring to thalassic and oceanic civilizations in the Atlantic as its predecessors.10
4.?IPR in the 1930s: Losing Autonomy from the Government
The deepening international crisis after the Great Depression, however, changed the atmosphere of 
the IPR significantly. Countries raised tariff barriers, and increasingly turned toward national au-
tarchies. The optimistic hope for regional cooperation permeated among IPR members in the 1920s 
had entirely gone. Especially, the Japan Council tightened its relations with the government. They fre-
quently consulted with the government over Manchuria problem. Before the Kyoto conference, Nito-
be, as the Japanese Chairman, received a massage from Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara, and a brief-
ing from Vice-Minister Shigeru Yoshida (Katagiri 1994, 55).
The heightened political tensions between Japan and China, which eventually led to the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931, made it almost impossible for the Japanese IPR members to keep staying out of 
politics. Before the fourth conference, which was planned to be held in Shanghai in 1931, Japanese 
members tried not to include the Manchurian problem in the conference program. At the Shanghai 
conference, which was held a month after the Manchurian Incident, Japanese members employed 
almost the same arguments as the official imperialistic views on Manchurian problem (Katagiri 1999, 
66?88). As Sandra Wilson points out, they were not necessarily forced to follow official positions. 
Certainly, it may be appropriate to call them as ?internationalists? in the sense that they sought for 
more cooperative international relations, yet they were never anti-imperialists. They saw little or no 
contradictions between advocating international cooperation and defending Japan’s ?legitimate 
interests? in China (Wilson 1992, 521). After Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933, the 
IPR conference increased its importance for the government as one of the few diplomatic channels left 
for Japan, and the Japan Council was increasingly put under government influences.
Nevertheless, even in the midst of the international crisis, the original stance of staying out of politics 
had not entirely lost from the IPR. The summary statement of the roundtable discussion on ?diplo-
matic relations in the Pacific? at the 1929 Kyoto conference declared;
The Institute of Pacific Relations is not a diplomatic body. It has no official connection in any way 
with governmental policy. Its genius is educational rather than political. None of its officers or 
members hold positions of official responsibility; but on the contrary, when official positions are 
accepted, that fact has been taken as necessitating the resignation from the Institute of the individ-
ual concerned. The fact must also be restated emphatically that the Institute, as such, does not en-
gage in the search for solutions of pressing political problems?11
The statement warned toward the members who ?may use the new light gained from their fellow 
members in the round-tables to bring whatever influence they have in their private capacities to bear 
on their home governments,? and stressed that the IPR ?merely provides a forum for the exchange of 
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ideas and opinions.? These cautious attitudes toward ?politicization? persisted even in the 1930s. The 
preliminary draft for the Shanghai Conference in 1931 stressed;
Ever since, the Institute has lived dangerously choosing for its main subject of discussion at each 
conference the hottest and most controversial issue of the moment?It is perhaps inevitable that 
this attack upon problems which are the subject of so much political controversy should lead to 
some misconceptions of the nature of the Institute’s discussions and their purpose. It has been 
suggested that the Institute is departing from its original purpose of scientific study and becoming 
a political organization. It has been characterized as ?amateur? or ?unofficial? diplomacy and even 
compared with the League of Nations? [However]The atmosphere of the discussion is distinctly 
non-emotional?12
The pamphlet prepared by the Secretariat for the fifth conference in Banff, Canada in August 1933, 
expressed a serious warning toward ?a growing tendency?for certain groups to use the administrative 
unit to formulate and advocate group opinions on matters under discussion,? and endorsed the origi-
nal principles of the IPR;
Individuals participate [in the IPR]?industries, corporations, organizations, and governments do 
not?The institute is not?concerned with immediate results and therefore by its own constitution 
prohibits the passing of resolutions or the making of recommendation in the field of public affairs
?What the Institute loses in its academic remoteness from immediate burning issues, it gains by a 
more basic and consequently sounder method of procedure?13
At this stage, even Japanese members did not entirely gave up efforts to restore international peace 
by strengthening regional security frameworks. Before the Banff conference in 1933, Takaki and Yoko-
ta Kizaburo, Professor of International law at the Tokyo Imperial University, who had cast serious 
doubt on Japan’s justification of Manchuria Incident on the ground of ?self-defense,? jointly submitted 
a preliminary paper entitled ?Some Consideration on the Future Reconstruction of Peace Machinery 
in the Pacific.? In this paper, they argued that the fundamental cause of current instabilities in the 
Asia-Pacific region could be attributed to inadequacy of the regional peace machinery, especially lack 
of instruments for alleviating economic injustices which might cause conflicts between ?Have? and 
?Have-not? nations. Then, they described the Manchurian problem as ?the conflict of Chinese and 
Japanese nationalism,? adding that ?nationalism was not only at the root of the Manchurian problem 
and the difficulties at Geneva, but also at the bottom of practically all of the problems of the world,? 
and emphasized the necessity of reconstructing peace machinery based on ?liquidated nationalism 
and revitalized internationalism.?14
By the late 1930s, however, the Japan Council lost their trust in IPR entirely. Facing the Sino?Japa-
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nese War, the Secretariat launched a new research project called ?Inquiry,? with the purpose of clarify-
ing ?objective? facts about the conflicts between Japan and China and promote better understanding 
on them. Though Japanese members at first agreed to it unwillingly, increased suspicion toward the 
IPR and heightened political tensions eventually made them to quit the membership.
5.?IPR in the 1940s: Getting into Politics to Influence Policymaking
As WWII was approaching, however, each national council even willingly strengthened their ties 
with the governments. The American Council, though it still tried to keep a certain degree of indepen-
dence, openly advocated that their research activities should be ?of the maximum use to the maximum 
number of governments.?15
After the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, the IPR, as the largest research-oriented institution 
specializing the Asia-Pacific area, was highly regarded by US government as an important source of 
knowledge and expert personnel on the area. In December 17, 1941, Robert G. Sproul, the chairman of 
the American Council, made a statement outlining the American Council’s fundamental policy in the 
wartime, and emphasized a ?fresh opportunity? that the war gave to the Council.
The officers and staff of the [American]Council?believe that the war situation, far from negating 
the purpose of the Council, lends new and crucial importance to its program of study and wide-
spread discussion of the issue at stake; that such activities, in fact, form a vital party of a demo-
cratic war effort?the American Council?believed that its years of efforts, developed to building 
up a body of knowledge and a group of persons with a broad understanding of the Far East, will 
now make possible a unique contribution in the emergency?16
Finding that Washington was ?woefully unprepared? to meet the immediate and pressing wartime 
needs for factual data, expert opinion and linguistic competence on the Asia-Pacific region, the Amer-
ican Council provided all kinds of intellectual resources such as publications, libraries, and expert per-
sonnel to government agencies. During 1941 and 1942, IPR research results were published in around 
50 volumes, which were widely circulated among the government agencies and defense agencies. The 
sales of the IPR publications just handled by the American Council alone rose from $11,800 in 1941 to 
$25,000 in 1942. The members of the American Council were recruited into official advisory positions 
on the Far Eastern problems. Close relationships between the IPR and the government agencies ulti-
mately led to the establishment of a joint office in Washington D.C. with the purpose of close liaisons 
between IPR members, the government agencies, the Embassies, and the other Allied countries.17
During the WWII, the IPR held two international conferences, the eighth conference held in Mont 
Tremblant, Canada in 1942, and the ninth Conference held in Hot Springs, Virginia, in January 1945. 
Because of their informal character, these two conferences were increasingly regarded by the govern-
ments of the Allied nations as an important forum to discuss wartime policy and postwar planning, 
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and were attended a large number of government officials. Though these officials attended in private 
capacity, they were considered by the other attendees as country representatives (Woods 1993, 32). For 
example, at the Mont Tremblant conference in 1942, there was Stanley K. Hornbeck, an adviser to US 
Department of State, and the former Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in Department of States. 
At the Hot Spring conference in 1945, there was Sir. George Sansom, a well-known Japanese specialist 
from the British Embassy. The conference documents and roundtable reports were sent to the govern-
ments for reference.
The IPR participants clearly recognized that the outbreak of WWII changed its traditional ?non-po-
litical? nature fundamentally. The preliminary report for the Mont Tremblant conference emphasized 
that the next conference would become ?an important departure from previous IPR practice? in the 
sense that it would have many persons holding government positions, and approved the ?politiciza-
tion? of the IPR;
This step [inviting many government officials]was considered necessary because so many of the 
competent, authorities in the field of Far Eastern and Pacific problems had gone into government 
service and because without the presence of some officials, the discussion on such a topic as coop-
eration of the United Nations in the Pacific would inevitably be unrealistic, if not actually mis-
leading. As it turned out, the presence added greatly to the seriousness and sense of responsibility 
in the round tables without appreciably lessening the frankness and vigor of the discussions?18
Conclusion
In 1925, the IPR was launched as an idealistic project which aimed at challenging the state-centric 
international order, and ultimately building a ?Pacific Community,? a transnational civil society in to-
day’s word. In its early period, IPR members shared the belief that non-governmental actors could be 
free from consideration on national interests, and the IPR should maintain its ?non-political? nature in 
order to pursue its higher ideals.
In the 1930s, however, the members began strengthening their ties with the governments, and grad-
ually lost their autonomy. The IPR became nothing but a supplementary forum of the official diplo-
matic channel, and IPR members became just another defenders of national interests. As the interna-
tional situation deteriorated, they increasingly found it hard to express different opinions from the 
official ones. Especially, Japanese members came under heavy influence of the Japanese government, 
who began to regard the IPR as an important forum for internationally isolated Japan to justify its ac-
tions in China.
During the WWII, IPR members even willingly contributed to formulating their governments’ war-
time and postwar policies with their knowledge and expertise on the Asia-Pacific region accumulated 
through the previous research activities. Especially, the American Council regarded the Pacific War as 
a ?fresh opportunity? for them, and provided all kinds of intellectual and human resources to US gov-
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ernment.
It should be noted that, however, even in the 1920s, the IPR was not a truly ?people-oriented? orga-
nization. Certainly, in principle, the IPR emphasized the diversity of its membership saying that, ?each 
[national] group aims to represent a cross-section of interests in its own country. There are no political 
affiliations, and an effort is made to include women as well as men, business as well as academic lead-
ers, labor men and capitalists, social workers and men of affairs.19 Most of IPR members, however, be-
longed to elite class including former prime ministers and former high-ranking government officials, 
and enjoyed strong connections with the governments. Certainly, they advocated that peoples, not 
governments, should be a central player in creating a new regional order. When they mentioned ?peo-
ples,? however, they meant only a handful of educated intellectuals, and what they saw uneducated and 
unenlightened ?mass? was excluded. They shared government’s contempt toward the ?mass? and neg-
ative feeling toward their participation in politics and diplomacy, believing that only elites who had 
enough skills and knowledge were able to successfully handle with these vital issues for the nation. Ni-
tobe’s following outspoken statement is a typical expression of elitism permeated among IPR members 
from the beginning. ?It is not upon the largest number of people we can depend for the maintenance 
of peace, but upon the thoughtful few who can lead the masses.?20 Due to strong sense of elitism and 
distrust towards the ?mass,? they could not maintain critical stances toward the government during 
the period of crisis, and eventually turned to the government rather than to peoples as a means to pre-
serve their influence in the society.
Today, transnational NGOs are increasingly becoming a visible actor in global politics. According to 
the Union of International Associations, the number of international NGOs increased from less than 
200 in 1909 to more than 20,000 in 2005, with much of the growth occurring since the 1970s (Her-
mann, et al. 2012, 1?2). Transnational NGOs have grown not only in number but also in their influ-
ence in international arena. Scholars increasingly point out how transnational NGOs have changed the 
landscapes of international politics.
Nevertheless, with regards to what kind of changes transnational NGOs have brought to the existed 
international order, scholars have been seriously divided. While Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sik-
kink (1998) and other pioneer work emphasize their positive contributions to international politics 
such as spreading global norms and promoting conflict resolution, recent studies have put more em-
phasis on critical analysis, and cast serious doubts as to whether they have really challenged the existed 
state-centric order (Chandhoke 2005).
However, here we find the permanent dilemma of NGOs between staying out of politics and getting 
into politics. Some people may say that the most important role of transnational NGOs is to criticize 
the existed state-centric order and to replace it with more people-centered order. Therefore they 
should maintain critical stances toward the governments. The other people may argue that transna-
tional NGOs should be more realistic and strategic, keeping and even strengthening cooperative rela-
tionships with the governments so that they can have maximum influences in policymaking process 
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and realize even a part of their original goals. As this paper shows, the IPR continued to face this di-
lemma, and gradually found its mission in getting into politics in order to influence policymaking pro-
cess.
When we envision the future regional order in the Asia-Pacific, we can no longer ignore the roles of 
transnational NGOs, which have constantly increased its number and influence. However, in order to 
estimate their real influences on the existed regional order, we should closely look at their relationships 
with the governments, and their attitudes toward the existed state-centric order.
With the unprecedented rise of transnational NGOs, the Asia-Pacific region, though slowly, is head-
ing toward IPR’s ultimate dream of ?Pacific Community?? Or, despite the increase in number, transna-
tional NGOs are not likely to bring significant changes to the existed state-centric order? Only through 
the detailed analyses on states-NGOs relations, we could know the answer. The history of the IPR con-
tains lots of useful lessons and thought-provoking episodes as to future possible roles of transnational 
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